Post-Globalization classification issues

The accelerated pace of development in emerging markets, particularly over the past decade has in large part been due to a wider adoption of capitalism, the transfer of knowledge and technologies and the growing importance of trade as a composition of the "Gross Domestic Product". These changes have had direct consequences on the earnings of a growing number of firms that have seen their revenue composition becoming more dependent on foreign market sales, making them less reliant and by consequence more resiliant to domestic matters.
Investor mindset, on the other hand, has been dragging its feet in acknowledging and adapting to these changes. This is particularly true for the institutional segment of the market, in particular pension plans that still tend to retain a significant "home" bias in their investment policy. Such biases can have material repercussions on both risk and returns over the long term, especially in the context of the current environment, one plagued by a rise in uncertainty and a greater perception of risk.
Classifying firms by country of incorporation is not only erroneous but also risky because it provides no information on geographic exposure to revenue generation. A European firm, for example, could have most of its sales  generated in economies that are outside of Europe, so does it make sense to classify the firm as European? This is not to say that the country of incorporation does not have any influence on the value of the firm through corporate governance and labor laws, it does, albeit to a lesser extent than what most people might think.
The "risk" element comes from the fact that by classifying a firm by country of incorporation rather than sales breakdown, you may inadvertently be managing a  portfolio that has a very high concentration on a particular market or economy. Diversifying this risk requires access to sales breakdown data, which may prove challenging to obtain. Once the country bias factor removed, the practitioner will not only be able to mitigate the inherent risk of this "traditional" approach, but also maybe concentrate on other factors such as valuation multiples to increase the probability of enhancing risk adjusted returns over the long run.

Calm before the storm?

The next crucial date in the Euro zone saga will be the 17 of June when Greece goes to the polls to effectively decide if they want stay in or out of the Euro. Greece might be a small player in the grand scheme of things but the role of market psychology is a multiple of this and is therefore what really matters.
A Greek exit could have severe repercussions on the rest of the Euro zone as it has the potential of triggering a serial bank run in a number of countries in which the banking system remains weak and for which the future European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is poorly equipped to handle. The uncertainty is huge and very palpable with Treasury and German Bund yields that are at record lows.
It seems that no degree of assurance by authorities can suffice to put minds at ease as there is so much that could go wrong and there are signs that things are actually getting worse.
As markets become more convinced that the situation is actually worsening, the sentiment will just accelerate the process of disintegration, like with a vacuum cleaner where the closer you get to the tip, the stronger the sucking power becomes. We currently see this phenomenon with Spain and its banking sector which is experiencing a sharp rise in bad loans, triggering a downgrade in credit rating which in turn is making it more difficult for the country to borrow. This is, after all, what pushed countries like Ireland and Greece to seek external help in the first place and although the European authorities and the IMF still have money to spare in their coffers, contagion will eventually make a bailout impossible, triggering a crisis the likes of which have not been seen since the 1930's.
I don't want to sound too alarmist, but as any good practitioner will tell you, it is important to think of all possible scenarios, starting with the worst one.

The high cost of being risk averse...

In these tumultuous times, compounded by a brewing crisis in the Euro-zone, demand for investments that have traditionally provided shelter from the damages of more "volatile" and "uncertain" times are on the rise. This phenomenon is especially observable in bond markets, at least for those sovereigns that are not perceived to be "drowning" in their debt.
As a matter of fact, the uncertain times, which is behind the strong demand for "safe" government bonds has created a situation where risk premiums have turned negative. This is because as nominal yields have dropped steadily, inflation has remained constant or is even rising, depending on which figures you use.
Take treasuries as an example. The average rate of inflation calculated by taking the consumer price index figures (CPI) from 1914 to 2011 amounts to about 3.25%. If we subtract this from the nominal yield rates of treasuries, the real yield turns out to be negative. The more worrying part of this observation is the fact that real yields are negative throughout all maturities which means that even if you were to hold 30 year treasuries, your return would be expected to be negative (the purchasing power of your capital will be shrinking every year!).
Negative yields are a boom for borrowers because it means that they can borrow very cheaply. The cost to the investor, however, should be an incentive for them to take on more risk, especially in an environment where returns are getting increasingly hard to come by. This is not happening and pundits that have been forecasting an end of the rally of bonds since 2007 have been consistently proven to be wrong. Not enough investors are moving their money out of treasuries to make yields go in the opposite direction. This could be reflecting sentiment that is highly bearish regarding the future which is not surprising when we look at the way in which the sovereign debt crisis is being handled in Europe.

From bad to worse?

The austerity measures in Europe are starting to bite but not in the right way. As governments impose painful belt tightening measures, recent statistical figures  provided by Eurosat, are pointing to a further bloating (degradation) of debt to GDP for the majority of Euro zone members. That certainly does not bode well, considering that the objective of austerity in the first place was to reduce the debt, not increase it! It could be the result of growing deficits and very weak or negative growth. It could also be that there is a sort of lag effect at play and that, over the longer term, there will be a positive impact on the debt. If this the case, it necessitates time to work, or patience, a commodity that respective governments are rapidly running low on. Country after country, the authorities are switching to crisis mode as the public become more vocal regarding their displeasure on the way things are being handled. Union is giving way to nationalism and the harmony of the past is disappearing.
Europe is in trouble, that we know, but maybe more worrying are the signs that things may be getting worse.

Changes in govt debt to GDP ratio, Q311 - Q411 (Eurostat)

From "dark pools" to "murky waters"...

Are "dark pools" a by-product of the singularity effect on markets?

As computing technology advances and as communication gets closer to being instantaneous, the whole landscape of investing is being impacted. This was first observed in a significant way with the so called "flash crash" of 2010, a glitch in computerized trading algorithms that, for a fraction of a second, sent the Dow tumbling down 9% before recovering.

The exponential growth in computing power and its increasing ubiquitousness in the financial markets are posing a threat to the more traditional approach to investment management. Rapid-fire traders, assisted by computing power running complex algorithms are able to second guess and place orders before your average investor can, thereby reaping the benefits of "first come, first serve". This is proving to be problematic for a whole range of investors that are ending up buying high and selling low.

Dark pools basically provide a way for investors to trade stocks away from public stock exchanges and, more importantly, away from the prying eyes of opportunist rapid-fire traders. Blackrock, for example, is in the process of setting up an "independent" fixed income trading platform for its clients. But even dark pools, it seems, are not immune from the clutches of the singularity effect, and, unfortunately, not always in a benign way.

According to a recent SEC finding, a firm called Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, that was running a so called "dark pool" for its clients, was actually using another firm it had created as the counter-party to its client trades. Even more revealing was the fact that the firm used sophisticated algorithms in its trading platform to outsmart the clients, thereby reaping nice profits from the trades. In other words, far from being shielded from the damages of high frequency traders, the "dark pool" the clients were trading in was nothing more than a mirage. This is unfortunate but could also suggest that possibly the only effective way to counter this trend would be to employ more computing power. With all the emotional bias shortcomings to investing that have become even more evident with the financial crisis, it might be time to rethink the whole approach to investing.

Is Spain the next Greece?

These are dire times for the Eurozone because, despite the positive effects of the LTRO, there doesn't seem to be any follow-up going on. The same medicine is being applied, i.e. forced austerity with no relief in sight. Even more worrying is the signs that the Greek triggered contagion seems to be spreading to the larger "peripheral" economy of Spain and this is where the real troubles begin. The country's fiscal balance and public debt were amongst the healthier ones of the zone when Greece's troubles first surfaced in 2010. Spain entered the crisis as a result of the real estate bubble that was being fuelled with cheap lending from core members. Unemployment is already rampant, at levels comparable to the "great depression" era of the 1930's and the austerity measures are only contributing to deepening the slump.
The graph above clearly shows that the LTRO effect is running out, accelerating the growth of the debt burden through higher borrowing costs. Unlike Greece, Spain's economy is significantly larger making it significantly more difficult to bail it out. If the Eurozone cannot afford having Greece fail for reasons of contagion, imagine the risk that Spain represents!

A novel approach to portfolio construction...

The traditional approach to building an investment portfolio with the aim of achieving a target wealth level for a set date in the future (typically retirement date) is relatively straight forward and involves discounting the future value of this portfolio to the present using an estimated discount rate which comprises a somewhat rough estimate of the expected annual growth rate of the portfolio. The major flaw with this approach is that the rate of return of the portfolio is very difficult to estimate, especially in the current volatile environment where visibility is relatively poor.

A far more intuitive and robust proposal would involve splitting an investment portfolio into two segments. One segment would be designated as the exposure that aims for capital preservation. This exposure contains investments that have very low risk and very low probability of experiencing drawdowns. The size of this segment should reflect the absolute strict minimum amount of wealth that the investor will need once he or she reaches retirement. The other segment comprises of the significantly riskier portion of the portfolio that the investors could afford to lose entirely but that should provide steady growth of the capital over the longer term.

You may wonder what the difference between this approach and a classic asset allocation portfolio comprised of a diversification between bonds and equities may be. The key difference is the the so called low risk allocation is there purely to preserve capital, it won't grow on its own but will increase in time through the reallocation of capital from the riskier segment, assuming that this segment does actually grow. The classical approach runs the risk of experiencing a sharp increase in correlations similar to 2008 when practically all asset classes were losing value simultaneously. Drawdowns in this novel approach should, instead, be limited to the "risk" portion of the portfolio.

The challenge in implementing this is twofold:

1. How do you ensure that the "capital preservation" allocation does its job in a world where capital losses may be incurred even with money market deposits, through the uncertainty regarding counterparty risk (Lehman's being the recent example)
2. The capital transfer from high risk to the low risk segments assumes that the high risk segment will grow through time. Nothing is less certain if we look at stock market performances over the more recent past!

Still, despite these challenges, the novel approach does provide a solution that is far more adapted to the current market environment and thus has a better chance of succeeding over the longer term.

Ripple effects...

A deal was struck (if we can call it a deal) last week between Greece and its private bondholders where up to 80% of them "agreed" to exchange their toxic debt against new ones that are thought to be less than half the face value. I guess the rational behind the acceptance was that it was a choice between getting something or nothing.

The more interesting question to ask is if this deal will trigger payments from credit default swap insurance on Greek bonds. Normally it should because the agreement is clearly akin to a technical default. If the body that decides on such matters argues that it is not a default, they run the risk of significantly damaging the credibility of the CDS markets, causing even greater burden on the borrowing of the other Euro-zone economies that are struggling with their debt.

If, on the other hand, they consider this action as a default, there is still great uncertainty as to how it will unfold. Just as in the Lehman and Dexia debacles in 2008, nobody really knows what the counterparty risk really is. We may have an idea of the amount of exposure and the main counterparties but we don't, for example, really know the counterparty to those counterparties.

The point is that in either of the two scenarios, there is bound to be ripple effects and it is difficult to estimate beforehand what the outcome of those ripple effects are likely to be.

If reason prevails (not always a given in financial markets), the governing body will rightly recognize the deal as the equivalent to a default. Greece has evidently defaulted on its debt, the question is, where will it spread next?

What is an equity index really measuring?

Equity indices are designed to measure the performance of a specific sector, market, region or even the entire world. They are meant to provide an indication of the type of returns you can "expect" from equities over the longer term but they also tend to suffer from some serious shortcomings that can have serious consequences.

Most popular indices for example only capture the price performance of its constituents typically weighted by capitalization (S&P 500) or just price (Dow Jones Industrials). What they don't capture, however, is the impact of dividends, especially when they are reinvested. Total return indices do exist, but they are unfortunately much less common and therefore rarely used and so investors are much less aware of them.

Even more rare are indices that are adjusted for inflation. That type of information is just not published but the impact can be very significant.

To show just how significant the effect of dividends and inflation can be on the return of an index, researchers in the U.S. did the calculations on the Dow Jones Industrials index and here is what they discovered:

If dividends were included since the inception of the DJI in 1896, it would have a value of more than 1,300,000 which is more than 100 times its recent high of 13,000!

If it was adjusted for inflation over the same period, it would shrink to a value today of around 500 which his about 96% below its actual current value.

Finally, if we were to combine the impact of reinvested dividends and inflation, the figure would be around 47,000 or almost 4 times its current value! In other words, the impact of reinvested dividends seems to be substantially greater than the impact of inflation (assuming inflation is correctly measured of course!)

All this to say that it is important to be aware of what exactly is being measured (or not) when looking at an index. Just as in the differences between price weighted and capitalization weighted indices, the effect of including dividends and/or inflation can lead to substantial differences in the results.

Are ETFs boosting correlations?

I came across a recent study that points out to a sharp rise in correlations between stocks right about the time when the ETF market has experienced exponential growth. Is it possible that the popularity of ETFs has led to a jump in equity correlations? It does seem plausible if we consider the way ETFs trade.

When you want to purchase an ETF, you usually go to the secondary market where buyers and sellers congregate. When the purchase amount is significant, however, it needs to be created through the primary market and the way this is done is through one of the designated brokers that deal directly with the sponsor in the primary market. The broker uses the investment cash to purchase a basket of stocks that reflect all the constituents and their respective weights of the underlying index. This is then exchanged against an equivalent number of units of the ETF. In the event of a redemption, the exact opposite happens, whereby the broker exchanges units of the ETF for an equivalent basket of stocks representative of the index. Now imagine a bear market scenario where a whole lot of redemption activity is going on. In the case of a broad market index ETF, the broker will have to liquidate a large number of stocks right about the same time. In other words, all the constituents of the index will be experiencing selling pressure at around the same time which means an increase in the correlation between them.

This estimated general increase in correlations has led to a situation where you need to hold a larger number of stocks to achieve an optimal level of diversification. It also further emphasizes the importance of ensuring a broad level of diversification between different asset classes.

Just about right...

The Fed has kept monetary policy aggressively loose and intends to do at least until sometime next year. Of course, this will depend on how the economy unfolds. Loose monetary policy has been the necessary medicine to keep the economy afloat, ever since the housing market bubble popped in 2007 but it has largely been ineffective in part because the Fed found itself in a "liquidity trap". The transmission system between Fed policy and bank lending is broken but there are signs that it is healing.

Monetary policy, in "normal" times can be a potent tool, which is why it needs to be wielded carefully if price stability is to be maintained (one of the two mandates of the Federal Reserve). One tool that can help determine whether the target rate is set "correctly" is what is known as the "Taylor Rule" named after the U.S. economist John Taylor. In its basic form, the Taylor Rule is a linear equation that determines what the Fed target rate should be. To do this, it takes the current rate of inflation and compares it to the "optimal" rate of inflation. It does the same with growth by comparing current output or GDP to "potential" GDP. Basically, the required target rate changes if either of these two factors are currently above or below their optimal or potential levels.

The graph above compares the actual Fed Funds Rate (white line) to that of the Taylor Rule Estimate (blue line). It is interesting to note that overall, the actual target rate and its estimate seem to be relatively well correlated and that currently the Taylor rule estimate seems to agree almost fully with the target rate. In other words, the estimate seems to fully support Fed policy.

More stimulus posturing...

The Fed signaled yesterday that it would probably maintain rates close to zero until sometime in 2014, a revision from a previous statement targeting 2013! All this is good because stimulus is still very much needed but it doesn't really help when you find yourself in a "liquidity trap". The economy is far from being out of the woods, the debt burden as a percentage of GDP continues to rise, fuelled by a budget deficit that shows no sign of shrinking whilst growth sputters, putting pressure on the government to adopt a more drastic austerity plan. This sort of pattern is endemic across a large number of the developed economies and most particularly in the Euro-zone that is facing its biggest challenge to date.

In Europe, heavy handed austerity measures have been force fed to the more "sickly" members of the Euro-zone. It is hoped that by doing so, the deficit will shrink and eventually turn into a surplus which should help reduce the mountainous pile of debt and, in turn, cut the overburden of borrowing costs. Austerity does have a major drawback in that it stifles growth, so the question becomes: will the shrinkage of the deficit through austerity have a greater impact on debt than the economic slowdown resulting from the same austerity?

Patience is a virtue but if we take history as a guide, these highly unpopular measures have never survived long enough. They are more likely to be traded in for some form of financial repression down the road.

In denial...

Standard and Poors, one of the big three rating agencies, fired a shot straight at the Euro-zone debacle over the weekend by downgrading the debt ratings of several countries, most notable of which was France and Austria losing their respective triple A ratings. Market reaction was somewhat mooted, probably because it is already reflected in the price, but the main message of the announcement was that things are really starting to go from bad to worse. Markets have become accustomed to the fact that the European "powers" (the "usual suspects" that call the shots) are very adept at organizing hollow summits but keep on falling short of what is needed to stop the situation from getting out of control.

Greek bonds are trading as if they have defaulted already (which they technically have) and there is still no agreement on what the so called "haircut" should be, but, maybe more worryingly, countries in the "too big to fail" camp such as Italy have been flirting with a whopping 7% yield on 10 years making it very costly to refinance at a time of austerity.

What the "authorities" don't seem to be paying much attention to is that even if what needs to be done to put an end to this mess is clear and will be deployed as a last resort, the delay itself will make it far more costly to intervene and there is a growing chance that it doesn't work at all.

It is clear that the treaty and the whole setup is not designed to function in this type of environment, it is a major flaw that the original architects didn't think through but, if they play their cards right, the Euro-zone that possibly emerges from this crisis situation will be far more robust in construction.

The impossible targets...

It is no wonder that the euro-zone peripheral countries are having such a difficult time getting their acts together, they are basically shooting themselves on the foot.
They don't have access to monetary policy tools that could help them inflate their way out of the debt conundrum, they don't have a federated political system that would automatically inject much needed cash into their economies, they don't have an independent central bank to rely on as "lender of last resort" that would put a cap on borrowing costs. To make matters worse, they cannot even resort to the tools that they do have at their disposal such as fiscal stimulus plans. These are severely constrained due mainly to outside imposed hard core austerity measures. They are in fact so severe that they risk triggering uprisings, threatening to plunge the whole continent into a deep recession with significant long term consequences.
To provide you an idea of what I am talking about, I recently came across some of the austerity measures that will be imposed on Greek citizens. I found them worrying to say the least.
According to the plan:

• Wages would be cut on average by 15%
• Pensions would be cut on average by 20%
• VAT would be increased by 4%
• A "solidarity" tax of between 2 and 5% would be levied
• The income tax threshold would drop from 12,000 EUR to 5,000 EUR
• Property tax would jump from 3 EUR to 5 EUR per square meter

There were additional measures which I don't recall but, even without them, this would be more than sufficient to trigger widespread rioting were it to be enforced.

In the end, when push comes to shove, it is likely that European authorities will take extraordinary measures to avert a total meltdown. What they are not really paying attention to, however, is that the more they wait, the more costly it will be.

Lender of last resort...

There is a reason why the Euro-zone seems unable to get itself out of the quagmire. It is dealing with the growing problem in a passive-reactive manner. There is a discernable pattern here:

1. the crisis shows signs of brewing
2. the core members of the zone get together to discuss the problem
3. at the meeting they announce that they have reached an agreement to boost the limit of the "bailout" fund
4. the markets react favorably for a day or two until the cycle is repeated again.

With a moving target in a deteriorating environment, it is difficult to see how readjusting the size of the bailout could ever work. Most of what is going on is psychological to begin with. The markets are very much aware that the tools the euro-zone members have at their disposal are insufficient to tackle the problem.

Psychology works in funny ways, we tend to overshoot all the time. In a stable environment, greed takes the upper hand whilst fear tends to reign when markets are in turmoil. In both cases there are exaggerations and the degree of the exaggeration depends very much on the circumstances of the time. It seems clear to me at least that the current approach has failed but what is more worrying is that the window of opportunity for the zone to extricate itself out of the quagmire is rapidly narrowing. Soon the only option on the table to avoid a meltdown will be to take out the heavy weapons.

The ECB, unlike many other central banks, does not have a mandate as lender of last resort and it may unwilling to use this option to avoid encouraging the risk of "moral hazard" down the line but it may end up being the only effective way to quash the psychological effect. The reason why this would work is because the human mind is much less effective in dealing with the concept of infinity: If you announce that you are taking a stance in the markets and you have close to unlimited resources to defend your stance, it will be far more credible than if you announce the ceiling of your resources from the very beginning. The Swiss National Bank's intervention in defense of the Swiss franc is a perfect example of this!

From idiosyncratic to systemic...

It is crucial to distinguish idiosyncratic risk from systemic risk. The former is related to risk that originates from or is inherent to a specific entity such as a firm, whilst the latter is risk that is exogenous to the firm. The reason why making a clear distinction between the two risks is so important is because their expected antidotes are so different. Idiosyncratic risk is normally handled by the management team of the firm and only involves outside intervention in situations of "too big to fail" where repercussions in terms of systemic risk become all too real. Systemic risk, on the other hand, is usually beyond the scope of management, it is more within the domain of policymakers.
Applying the distinction to the current Euro-zone crisis, we began with a form of risk when the peripheral members started to ring the alarm bells in the first half of 2010 that was borderline idiosyncratic but still relatively contained. This explains why the initial response to this "mini" crisis was relatively muted: the creation of a fund that would aim at bailing out heavily indebted nations that were having difficulty with their payments. The risk started to take on a more systemic form when the number of troubled countries began to increase and as it began to involve countries that had economies that were far bigger than the first wave. The EU response to this was mainly to increase the size of the "bailout" fund but not much else when what they really should have been doing was to approach the problem from a completely different angle. But herein lies the problem: the Euro-zone in its current incarnation was never designed to handle such challenges.

It seems to me that the original architects of the Euro-zone project are now paying a heavy price for having suppressed the major risks or negative points that were outlined in the independent study on the creation of a Euro-zone that had been commissioned by the core governments of the project. As we can see from the CDS graph of Italy, it is just another example of too little, too late.

The commodities - stagflation link...

There is growing consensus that the broad based commodity price rise is here to stay at least for a while. This is mainly because of growing demand coming from emerging markets. The rise in prices is having a material wealth distribution impact on the economies of emerging and developed countries. Commodity rich emerging market economies are benefitting tremendously from the price hikes which is also fueling their appetite, whilst for those of most if not all developed markets, the impact is similar to a tax effect as the commodity price increase is almost entirely passed on to the consumer.
Another less obvious effect of this long term rise in prices is the potential it has of triggering a much dreaded stragflationary environment. This is mainly because developed market economies have already entered a period of weak growth/recession at a time where "headline" inflation remains clearly above the target of central banks. In theory, the longer inflationary pressures persist, the greater the risk that they have an impact on the future expectations of inflation, which in some instances, can eventually lead to an inflationary spiral. Once a spiral sets in, it becomes very difficult to control. Although we may be far away from such a scenario, the effect of a long term rise in commodity prices should not be underestimated.

In double-dip territory?

There is ongoing debate as to whether the economies of both the U.S. and Europe have re-entered a recession, but the real question should be whether it ever got out of one! We unfortunately will not know for sure for at least a couple of years to come because of the tremendous adjustments lag between the initial data collecting and the final official figure. There are, however, strong clues that the recession that began soon after the sub-prime crisis erupted in 2007 is still around. The only reason why markets were rallying in 2009 and 2010 were because of the massive concerted government efforts to keep their respective economies afloat. A bull in a bear market if you will but, as the ammunition is being rapidly depleted, the effects of this are reverberated across the financial spectrum. Volatility is rising sharply, commodity prices are dropping and treasury yields, the ultimate safe haven investment (despite the downgrade), is at record lows. So from a technical standpoint, there is growing evidence to suggest that what we are experiencing is not a double-dip or "W" type of recession but more like a very extended "U" type. The rally in 2009 and 10 were just smokescreens and the markets are just discovering that now.

What the sectors are telling us...

A cursory look at stock market sector performances can provide a good sense of the current market sentiment. The graph above measures the year to date performances of the major sectors of the world economy and is not distorted by currency fluctuations.

As a first observation, it is interesting to note the wide performance divergences between the various sectors. There is, for example, more than a 20% difference between the best (health care) and worst (financials) performing sectors. This tends to occur in periods of uncertainty.

The next interesting observation would be the divergence between cyclical and defensive sectors. The better performers (health care, consumer staples) tend to be the defensive sectors which would indicated very bearish sentiment in the markets.

It should come as no surprise that financials are suffering the most considering the uncertainty facing European banks exposed to the sovereign debt of troubled euro zone peripheral countries. What is more curious, however, is the relatively strong positioning of sectors like information technology or energy. For the tech sector, it reflects the boom in technology stocks. Some pundits are drawing parallels with the nineties, arguing that the market may actually be in a bubble.

For energy, however, it is a bit more baffling, markets are clearly pricing a high probability for recession (the negative ranking of materials and industrials clearly show this) but oil prices do not seem to reflect this! Pressure from proponents of peak oil and the continued strength of emerging market economies may go some way to explain this, but who knows? Sentiment can sometimes be finicky.

Rebalancing vs. Buy & Hold

In these tumultuous times, one wonders what sort of investment strategy to adopt. The modern portfolio theory rule of thumb would be to "stick to one's guns" by remaining thoroughly diversified and keeping a disciplined approach to rebalancing the portfolio when asset class weights deviate "too far away" from a defined optimal value.

Rebalancing can actually be tricky in times of high volatility not only because it may require quick action to counter large sways in the market but also because of the additional transaction costs that frequent "adjustment" trading could entail.

There is, however, an optimal level of rebalancing that can be implemented, depending on market volatility conditions. Studies show, for example, that rebalancing (adjusted for transaction costs) outperforms buy and hold strategies in periods of high volatility where markets experience sharp reversals. The opposite occurs in bull or bear market conditions, where the markets follow a clear trend. In this environment, buy and hold strategies tend to outperform rebalancing.

An optimal portfolio allocation strategy would therefore be one that is a function of the volatility levels of the markets. When volatility levels spike, as they have over the last couple of weeks, it would trigger a rebalancing signal for the portfolio. This could be in the form of a tightening of the rebalancing band limits of the respective asset classes. In contrast, when volatility levels are subdued, those same band limits should widen, reducing the probability of rebalancing but not eliminating them altogether, which would be risky, especially in transition periods from low volatility to high volatility.