Post-Globalization classification issues

The accelerated pace of development in emerging markets, particularly over the past decade has in large part been due to a wider adoption of capitalism, the transfer of knowledge and technologies and the growing importance of trade as a composition of the "Gross Domestic Product". These changes have had direct consequences on the earnings of a growing number of firms that have seen their revenue composition becoming more dependent on foreign market sales, making them less reliant and by consequence more resiliant to domestic matters.
Investor mindset, on the other hand, has been dragging its feet in acknowledging and adapting to these changes. This is particularly true for the institutional segment of the market, in particular pension plans that still tend to retain a significant "home" bias in their investment policy. Such biases can have material repercussions on both risk and returns over the long term, especially in the context of the current environment, one plagued by a rise in uncertainty and a greater perception of risk.
Classifying firms by country of incorporation is not only erroneous but also risky because it provides no information on geographic exposure to revenue generation. A European firm, for example, could have most of its sales  generated in economies that are outside of Europe, so does it make sense to classify the firm as European? This is not to say that the country of incorporation does not have any influence on the value of the firm through corporate governance and labor laws, it does, albeit to a lesser extent than what most people might think.
The "risk" element comes from the fact that by classifying a firm by country of incorporation rather than sales breakdown, you may inadvertently be managing a  portfolio that has a very high concentration on a particular market or economy. Diversifying this risk requires access to sales breakdown data, which may prove challenging to obtain. Once the country bias factor removed, the practitioner will not only be able to mitigate the inherent risk of this "traditional" approach, but also maybe concentrate on other factors such as valuation multiples to increase the probability of enhancing risk adjusted returns over the long run.

Calm before the storm?

The next crucial date in the Euro zone saga will be the 17 of June when Greece goes to the polls to effectively decide if they want stay in or out of the Euro. Greece might be a small player in the grand scheme of things but the role of market psychology is a multiple of this and is therefore what really matters.
A Greek exit could have severe repercussions on the rest of the Euro zone as it has the potential of triggering a serial bank run in a number of countries in which the banking system remains weak and for which the future European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is poorly equipped to handle. The uncertainty is huge and very palpable with Treasury and German Bund yields that are at record lows.
It seems that no degree of assurance by authorities can suffice to put minds at ease as there is so much that could go wrong and there are signs that things are actually getting worse.
As markets become more convinced that the situation is actually worsening, the sentiment will just accelerate the process of disintegration, like with a vacuum cleaner where the closer you get to the tip, the stronger the sucking power becomes. We currently see this phenomenon with Spain and its banking sector which is experiencing a sharp rise in bad loans, triggering a downgrade in credit rating which in turn is making it more difficult for the country to borrow. This is, after all, what pushed countries like Ireland and Greece to seek external help in the first place and although the European authorities and the IMF still have money to spare in their coffers, contagion will eventually make a bailout impossible, triggering a crisis the likes of which have not been seen since the 1930's.
I don't want to sound too alarmist, but as any good practitioner will tell you, it is important to think of all possible scenarios, starting with the worst one.

The high cost of being risk averse...

In these tumultuous times, compounded by a brewing crisis in the Euro-zone, demand for investments that have traditionally provided shelter from the damages of more "volatile" and "uncertain" times are on the rise. This phenomenon is especially observable in bond markets, at least for those sovereigns that are not perceived to be "drowning" in their debt.
As a matter of fact, the uncertain times, which is behind the strong demand for "safe" government bonds has created a situation where risk premiums have turned negative. This is because as nominal yields have dropped steadily, inflation has remained constant or is even rising, depending on which figures you use.
Take treasuries as an example. The average rate of inflation calculated by taking the consumer price index figures (CPI) from 1914 to 2011 amounts to about 3.25%. If we subtract this from the nominal yield rates of treasuries, the real yield turns out to be negative. The more worrying part of this observation is the fact that real yields are negative throughout all maturities which means that even if you were to hold 30 year treasuries, your return would be expected to be negative (the purchasing power of your capital will be shrinking every year!).
Negative yields are a boom for borrowers because it means that they can borrow very cheaply. The cost to the investor, however, should be an incentive for them to take on more risk, especially in an environment where returns are getting increasingly hard to come by. This is not happening and pundits that have been forecasting an end of the rally of bonds since 2007 have been consistently proven to be wrong. Not enough investors are moving their money out of treasuries to make yields go in the opposite direction. This could be reflecting sentiment that is highly bearish regarding the future which is not surprising when we look at the way in which the sovereign debt crisis is being handled in Europe.

From bad to worse?

The austerity measures in Europe are starting to bite but not in the right way. As governments impose painful belt tightening measures, recent statistical figures  provided by Eurosat, are pointing to a further bloating (degradation) of debt to GDP for the majority of Euro zone members. That certainly does not bode well, considering that the objective of austerity in the first place was to reduce the debt, not increase it! It could be the result of growing deficits and very weak or negative growth. It could also be that there is a sort of lag effect at play and that, over the longer term, there will be a positive impact on the debt. If this the case, it necessitates time to work, or patience, a commodity that respective governments are rapidly running low on. Country after country, the authorities are switching to crisis mode as the public become more vocal regarding their displeasure on the way things are being handled. Union is giving way to nationalism and the harmony of the past is disappearing.
Europe is in trouble, that we know, but maybe more worrying are the signs that things may be getting worse.

Changes in govt debt to GDP ratio, Q311 - Q411 (Eurostat)

From "dark pools" to "murky waters"...

Are "dark pools" a by-product of the singularity effect on markets?

As computing technology advances and as communication gets closer to being instantaneous, the whole landscape of investing is being impacted. This was first observed in a significant way with the so called "flash crash" of 2010, a glitch in computerized trading algorithms that, for a fraction of a second, sent the Dow tumbling down 9% before recovering.

The exponential growth in computing power and its increasing ubiquitousness in the financial markets are posing a threat to the more traditional approach to investment management. Rapid-fire traders, assisted by computing power running complex algorithms are able to second guess and place orders before your average investor can, thereby reaping the benefits of "first come, first serve". This is proving to be problematic for a whole range of investors that are ending up buying high and selling low.

Dark pools basically provide a way for investors to trade stocks away from public stock exchanges and, more importantly, away from the prying eyes of opportunist rapid-fire traders. Blackrock, for example, is in the process of setting up an "independent" fixed income trading platform for its clients. But even dark pools, it seems, are not immune from the clutches of the singularity effect, and, unfortunately, not always in a benign way.

According to a recent SEC finding, a firm called Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, that was running a so called "dark pool" for its clients, was actually using another firm it had created as the counter-party to its client trades. Even more revealing was the fact that the firm used sophisticated algorithms in its trading platform to outsmart the clients, thereby reaping nice profits from the trades. In other words, far from being shielded from the damages of high frequency traders, the "dark pool" the clients were trading in was nothing more than a mirage. This is unfortunate but could also suggest that possibly the only effective way to counter this trend would be to employ more computing power. With all the emotional bias shortcomings to investing that have become even more evident with the financial crisis, it might be time to rethink the whole approach to investing.

Is Spain the next Greece?

These are dire times for the Eurozone because, despite the positive effects of the LTRO, there doesn't seem to be any follow-up going on. The same medicine is being applied, i.e. forced austerity with no relief in sight. Even more worrying is the signs that the Greek triggered contagion seems to be spreading to the larger "peripheral" economy of Spain and this is where the real troubles begin. The country's fiscal balance and public debt were amongst the healthier ones of the zone when Greece's troubles first surfaced in 2010. Spain entered the crisis as a result of the real estate bubble that was being fuelled with cheap lending from core members. Unemployment is already rampant, at levels comparable to the "great depression" era of the 1930's and the austerity measures are only contributing to deepening the slump.
The graph above clearly shows that the LTRO effect is running out, accelerating the growth of the debt burden through higher borrowing costs. Unlike Greece, Spain's economy is significantly larger making it significantly more difficult to bail it out. If the Eurozone cannot afford having Greece fail for reasons of contagion, imagine the risk that Spain represents!

A novel approach to portfolio construction...

The traditional approach to building an investment portfolio with the aim of achieving a target wealth level for a set date in the future (typically retirement date) is relatively straight forward and involves discounting the future value of this portfolio to the present using an estimated discount rate which comprises a somewhat rough estimate of the expected annual growth rate of the portfolio. The major flaw with this approach is that the rate of return of the portfolio is very difficult to estimate, especially in the current volatile environment where visibility is relatively poor.

A far more intuitive and robust proposal would involve splitting an investment portfolio into two segments. One segment would be designated as the exposure that aims for capital preservation. This exposure contains investments that have very low risk and very low probability of experiencing drawdowns. The size of this segment should reflect the absolute strict minimum amount of wealth that the investor will need once he or she reaches retirement. The other segment comprises of the significantly riskier portion of the portfolio that the investors could afford to lose entirely but that should provide steady growth of the capital over the longer term.

You may wonder what the difference between this approach and a classic asset allocation portfolio comprised of a diversification between bonds and equities may be. The key difference is the the so called low risk allocation is there purely to preserve capital, it won't grow on its own but will increase in time through the reallocation of capital from the riskier segment, assuming that this segment does actually grow. The classical approach runs the risk of experiencing a sharp increase in correlations similar to 2008 when practically all asset classes were losing value simultaneously. Drawdowns in this novel approach should, instead, be limited to the "risk" portion of the portfolio.

The challenge in implementing this is twofold:

1. How do you ensure that the "capital preservation" allocation does its job in a world where capital losses may be incurred even with money market deposits, through the uncertainty regarding counterparty risk (Lehman's being the recent example)
2. The capital transfer from high risk to the low risk segments assumes that the high risk segment will grow through time. Nothing is less certain if we look at stock market performances over the more recent past!

Still, despite these challenges, the novel approach does provide a solution that is far more adapted to the current market environment and thus has a better chance of succeeding over the longer term.

Ripple effects...

A deal was struck (if we can call it a deal) last week between Greece and its private bondholders where up to 80% of them "agreed" to exchange their toxic debt against new ones that are thought to be less than half the face value. I guess the rational behind the acceptance was that it was a choice between getting something or nothing.

The more interesting question to ask is if this deal will trigger payments from credit default swap insurance on Greek bonds. Normally it should because the agreement is clearly akin to a technical default. If the body that decides on such matters argues that it is not a default, they run the risk of significantly damaging the credibility of the CDS markets, causing even greater burden on the borrowing of the other Euro-zone economies that are struggling with their debt.

If, on the other hand, they consider this action as a default, there is still great uncertainty as to how it will unfold. Just as in the Lehman and Dexia debacles in 2008, nobody really knows what the counterparty risk really is. We may have an idea of the amount of exposure and the main counterparties but we don't, for example, really know the counterparty to those counterparties.

The point is that in either of the two scenarios, there is bound to be ripple effects and it is difficult to estimate beforehand what the outcome of those ripple effects are likely to be.

If reason prevails (not always a given in financial markets), the governing body will rightly recognize the deal as the equivalent to a default. Greece has evidently defaulted on its debt, the question is, where will it spread next?