27 September, 2007

A step closer to stagflation?

Last week's 50 basis point cut revived fears of a surge in inflation as it took place in an environment in which commodity prices are surging and the dollar continues to weaken. This is evident in the yield curve, which, from the beginning of the year has shifted from being inverted to becoming normal or upward slanting. It would suggest that the market is pricing in a future surge in inflation. But it is not as straight forward as it seems because we are in a precarious environment of recovery from the subprime/short term liquidity shock. The Fed's use of the federal funds rate, the most prized weapon from its arsenal of instruments, leaves it with fewer tools with which to manage the crisis. The worry is that this 50 basis point cut may not suffice given the downward pressure that would arise if consumers battered by shrinking home prices and higher gasoline prices decided to cut on spending, prompting further cuts by the Fed.
On a side note, the crisis may be providing an opportunity for buyout activity and we are seeing signs of this with the news that Warren Buffet may be looking into purchasing a stake of Bear Stearns.

19 September, 2007

The Fed's risky gambit

Yesterday's 50 basis point cut took the markets by surprise, sending a clear message that the Fed had nailed the coffin on it's inflation bias and was now clearly more preoccupied by the mortgage/liquidity crisis and its potential impact on growth rather than on a possible surge in inflation. Last week's gloomy labor figures and yesterday's weaker than expected PPI release seems to have emboldened the case for more aggressive cuts. On the flip side of the coin the combined effect of the rate cut, oil at record levels and a steadily weakening dollar is bound to raise the risks on the inflation front.
Next in line are the financials sector earnings results which should provide us a clearer picture on the extent of damage from the sub prime crises. Lehman's better than expected results gives reason for hope for the rest of the industry but all this could very rapidly turn sour by just one disappointment. The market environment remains precarious and this is reflected in the high volatility levels.

14 September, 2007

The absolute return fallacy and the black swan revisited

The definition of absolute return, a term originally coined by the managers of the Yale endowment fund, refers to an investment instrument that is expected to provide positive returns irrespective of market conditions. In other words, it should be uncorrelated to market swings. Ever since the collapse of LTCM, however, the whole premise on which this concept lies has been put into doubt. The systemic backlash from what started off as a relatively benign and contained issue within the subprime space proves that there is a major failure in the modelling of risk for certain types of products. How else can one explain the bewilderment of managers? The ever so common excuse of late is that they were caught by surprise, that it was the first time that such a thing had occured and therefore they were unprepared for the consequences of such an event. It begs the question as to why they were unprepared or, more precisely, why they did not include such a scenario into their models in the first place? It is worrying enough to note that according to a recent Wall Street Journal article, the average return of hedge funds for the month of August was more than minus 1 percent (more than minus 2 percent for fund of funds). What is more telling, however, is that the average reflects only 40% of the total because the rest of them have not yet published their results and the delay could indicate far worse results ahead. Blaming systemic risk or an unprecedented chain of events is frankly not a justifiable excuse, particularly for an industry that is reputed for its exorbitant fees.

07 September, 2007

Navigating without a compass...

Earlier this year when the sharp rise in subprime delinquencies were announced, it was largely shrugged off by the markets due to the relatively small size of the submprime market in comparison to the rest of the mortgage industry. The risk of contagion was thought to be minute as the problems appeared to be specific to this particular segment of the market. What was not taken into consideration, however, was the widespread use of leverage across the board, fuelled by record low borrowing rates, reckless lending and the competitive pressure to generate higher returns in an environment of performance compression. The potent cocktail of illiquid investments and the heavy use of leverage led to a sharp selloff in August, prompting central bank intervention to restore normalcy. As calm returned, it became quickly evident that it would not last long as the core problem was far from being resolved.
The markets are in effect navigating without a compass as nobody has a full grasp of the extent of contagion. This is a result of the lag in reporting not only with regards to certain types of investment vehicles such as hedge funds (some of which are heavily exposed to the subprime market) , but also economic releases, a key barometer for the health of the economy. Today's negative U.S. employment figures for August are a good example of the lag. Reporting for the month of August (ground zero) is just beginning to surface now which means that we can expect more turbulence on the horizon.

29 August, 2007

Bernanke put to the test...

It seems that Fed action has failed to convince the market that the worst of the debt crisis is behind us and that it is doing its utmost to fix the problem. Indeed, the volatility index shot back up, short term treasury yields plummeted and stock markets were trading lower. But this only lasted a day which leads one to wonder whether what we are witnessing here are a series of aftershocks that should subside in time or the prelude to yet another major jolt. Considering that there are a large number of investments for which their August performances to date remain unknown and that, as a result, we are likely to face more bad news, it seems prudent to anticipate more turbulence ahead. The Fed's confidence building measures have clearly helped sooth tensions, but it is increasingly perceived as too little too late. Too little because we expect more turbulence in coming weeks and months and too late because three days before all hell broke loose, the Fed stated that it was more preoccupied with inflation than with the sub prime debacle. At present the markets are factoring in a quarter point cut to occur anytime between now and the next Fed meeting on the 18th of September and, with the recent jump in long term treasury yields, seem to believe that Fed policy has shifted away from an inflationary bias.

23 August, 2007

After the storm...

Thanks to the concerted efforts of central bank cash injections and the Fed's decision to cut its discount window by half a percent, extend loans to as much as a month and make it clear that even sub prime paper would be accepted as collateral, things look like they are going back to normal. The root of the current crises stems from the innovative changes in the way in which debt is created. Over the last decade we have seen an explosion in the issuance of asset backed securities whereby a relatively illiquid market of loans against some type of collateral are pooled together, divided into quality tranches and securitized. This has worked wonders for those who have traditionally had difficulty in obtaining financing. It has also proved beneficial to investors by allowing them to tap into new market segments in a risk controlled manner (given that many borrowers are pooled together and therefore diversified). But these instruments carry a large drawback in the form of a lack of transparency. The investors do not know what percentage of what they hold will default. That might not matter when things are going well. But when you have a problem such as the recent sudden surge in delinquencies in a sub prime market that came about because lenders, who got accustomed to a low interest rate environment, got carried away with their lending, things can very rapidly turn sour. Liquidity dried up almost instantly because the lender did not know if the borrower was exposed to this toxic market. Confidence was also eroded with the collapse of the Bear Stearns hedge funds considering they had very high ratings. It will be interesting to see if this time around the Fed will take any measures to improve transparency.

15 August, 2007

A meltdown?

The recent global market slide sparked by fears of a looming credit crunch might very well be the first stages of the so called great unwind. Investors were taken by surprise, especially those that were under the impression of being hedged against this very type of loss. It just comes to show that complex derivative strategies don't always perform as expected.
There are signs that we may be entering a protracted slowdown phase for the global economy. We all recognize the beneficial effects of globalization on growth, especially in terms of its disinflationary impact. If we take the recent past as an example, another beneficial effect seems to be longer lasting economic cycles. What use to be 7 to 8 years of expansion before a recession now seems to last in the range of 9 to 10 years. Greater coordination between central banks and a more prudent approach to monetary policy clearly play a role in this.
But there are signs that the party is coming to a close. As yields worldwide continue to rise, the housing woes will continue to deteriorate. Since consumers perceive housing in a similar manner to stocks, this will invariably have a negative impact on the wealth effect in addition to the effect of higher food and energy prices. Eventually, the yield curve may reinvert. That in itself is not enough to suggest a looming recession. For that to happen, we also need to add rapidly deteriorating credit spreads (something that seems to be occurring at the moment).

03 August, 2007

The volatility factor

The slide in global markets over the last two weeks were precipitated by markedly higher volatility levels which first spiked when Chinese woes sent stocks on a tailspin back in February last. Higher volatility inflate risk premiums (no wonder it figures in the Black and Scholes option pricing model) creating havoc for certain segments of the markets. More volatility can also be a good thing, depending on how you are structured. With a sudden jump in the vix index, one of the first reactions tends to be a general flight to quality and the most recent market turmoil is a perfect example of this. Credit spreads have widened substantially as money has poured out of corporate and high yield bonds towards the safety of treasuries. There is also a move out of riskier emerging market stocks towards those of developed markets. We can add to this the switch from small cap to large cap although part of it is related to the advanced stage of the cycle. Finally, there tends to be sector rotation in favor of defensive industries such as consumer staples or health care during periods of high volatility.

DISCLAIMER

This document has been produced purely for the purpose of information and does not therefore constitute an invitation to invest, nor an offer to buy or sell anything nor is it a contractual document of any sort. The opinions on this blog are those of the author which do not necessarily reflect the opinions of Lobnek Wealth Management. No part of this publication may be reproduced or distributed in any form or by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the author. Contents subject to change without notice.